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Farm Policy and Mandatory Supply
Controls The Case ofTobacco
Kenneth C. Curruro
ROM 1980 through 1986, the United States spent
543.9 billion in dir-ect payments to fan-men-s and 852.3
billion on otherprice support progi-ams.’Despite such
expenditures the US. farm sector’ has experienced a
severe downturn. Falling expon-ts, declining far-mland
values, high n’ates of fan’m loan delinquencies and
increasing dependence on governnient support pay-
ments wen-e visible symptoms of the fan-ni sector’s
difficulties.
Because of the great expense and the apparent
failure of farm programs, some policymaken’s have
called fon’ the rise of mandatony supply controls tci
limit crop production arid r-aise pr-ices! Advocates
asser-t that such controls could guarantee farmers a
‘fair” price and impnove their incomes while dnasti-
cally cutting the cost offarm programs arid eliminat-
ing farm commodity surpluses.
Kenneth C. Carraro ‘san economist at the FederalReserve BankofSt
Louis. Dawn M. Peterson provided research assistance.
lU.5. DepartmentofAgriculture, History ofBudgetary Expenditures of
the Commodity Credit Corporation, Book 2, and Agricultural Outlook
(December1987), p.53, table 32.
‘The Harkin-Gephardt “Save the Family Farm Act” is the most
prominent domestic example of mandatory supply control legisla-
tion currently being debated in Congress. In 1986, Congress allo-
cated $10 million for the studyofmandatory controls andthe polling
offarmers. Mandatorysupply controls have recentlybeen proposed
in the European Economic Community to limit milk production.
This an-tide examines the effects of mnariclatony sup-
ply controls. The analysis begins with a theon-etical
discussion ofthe effects ofmandatony supply contr-ols
on economies that ar-c closed to inter-national tradie
and those that engage in inter-national trade. Next, the
experience of theUS. tobacco industry and its mnanda-
tony supply controis is examined! finally, the key
points fr-tim the theoretical discussion arid the U.S.
tobacco industry’s experience are combined with spe-
cific facts about U.S. cnops to suggest the likely conse-
quences ofthe supply legislation cun-r-entlyunder con-
sideration.
THE ECONOMICS OF SUP.PLY
CONTROLS IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
Supply control pr’ograms am-e designed to increase
the price rif a good above its fl-ce market pt-ice by
restricting the quantity of the good that n-caches the
mar’ket. The supply restrictions typically are estab-
lished by a gover-nment agency or a consortium of
pn’oducei-s- The Organization of Petr-oleum Exporting
Countries OPEC) is one example of a group of pro-
ducers who agree (usually) to r-estn’ict production as a
means of securing ahigher price for crude (iii.
‘us. tobacco policy has used mandatorysupply controls since the
1930s.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OY ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1055
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Figure 1 demonstrates how prices am-c determined
in an economy that is closed to inter-national tn’ade
and how supply controls can incn’ease the price of a
good above its free market level. The supply curve,
labeled 5, rises upward and to the n-ight, indicating
that producers will supply larger quantities of agood
as itspr-ice is incr-eased. ‘i’he short-run demand cun’ve,
labeled D,,slopes downward to show that consumers
will buy smaller quantities of agood as its pr-ice r-ises.
In a free market, the intersection rif the supply and
demand curves at point A determines that the price
would be P while the quantity supplied would equal
the quantity demanded, at Q. Sincethe quantity ofthe
good supplied to the marker at that price exactly
satisfies consumer- demand, neither producer-s nor
consumers have an incentive to change their’ pr-oduc-
tion or consumption patterns -
By imposing a supply limit at Q,, the pr-ice can be
increased fi-om P, to P,. This would benefit producers,
however-, only if it increased their profits. Since pro-
duction declines, the total costs incurred by pro-
ducers will decline also. As long as total revenue is not
reduced by an amount larger than the reduction of
total costs, profits will rise.
The change in total n-evenue resulting fi’om a price
change depends upon the pr-ice elasticity of demand.
The price elasticity of demand measures the respon-
siveness of the quantity demanded to a change in
price. Ifthe quantity of a product demanded changes
proportionately less in absolute value I than the
change hi price, the demand is r-eferred to as inelastic.
Since aI per-cent increase in pr-icecauses less than a
1 percent decn’ease in quantity demanded when do-
mand is inetastic, the price inicr-ease causes total n’ev’e—
nue to incnease. Conver-sety, a pnice decr’ease causes
total revenue to decrease when demand is inelastic.
The effects on total r’evenue of tin-ice changes ar’e
i-evem-sed when demand is elastic. Elastic demand ex-
ists when the quantity of a product demanidedi
changes pi-opon-tionatelv more in alisolute valuel than
the change in pr-ice. Since a 1 per-cent ir’icn’ease in pi’ice
causes a more than 1 per-cent decm-ease in quantity
demanded when demand is elastic, the pn-ice incn-ease
causes total n-ex.’enue to decrease. Conversely, a pr-ice
decrease causes total r-evenue to increase when tIe-
mand is elastic. A final possibility, known as unitary
elasticity, is that a 1 per-cecil change in price leads tn a
1 percent change in quantity demanded, which has no
effect on total revenue.
in figure 1, the supply contn’oh, which n-educed the
quantity supplied flom Q, to Q,, appear-s to have
causedithe price approximately to douhile from P to P2.
The quantity demanded, however’, appear-s to have
decreased much less. In other- won’ds, the demaridi is
considered to be inelastic in that price r-ange. When
thedemand fun-a product isinelastic, asupply contr-ol
pr-ogram incr-eases the total n-evenue of producer’s.
Since, total costs wilt have fallen also, profits must
increase.
When the demand for-a pr-odluct is elastic,a supply
control pn’ogm-am would reduce the quantity tie—
manded pr-opor-tionately mon-c than the price in-
crease. ‘the reduction in total revenue makes it possi-
ble that the supply contr’ol program could lead to
r-educed pmofits. In general, a supply contn’oI pn’ogr-am
is beneficial to producers facing an inelastic demand.
A variety of factors influence the elasticity of de-
mand for a pm-oduct. One of the most impomtant of
these is the availability ofsubstitutes for- the product. A
product’s demand is more likely to be elastic ifaccept-
able substitutes for that pmoduct exist. For example,
the price elasticit of beef likely exceeds that of gaso-
line because there are numen’ous substitutes for’ beef
while then-ear-c few substitutes forgasoline.
Another’ extremely important influence on demand
elasticity is time- In the short r-un,a pr’oduct’s demand
is generally less elasticthan overthe tong run because
consumers find substitutes on-learn toconserve on the
consumption of the product over’ time. Demand be-
comes more elastic the toriger the time period as
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Rest of the World
consumer’s readjust their- consumption patterns.4
Figure 1 portrays the effect of changes in demand
elasticity overtime. ‘Thecurve DLportrays the long-run
demand curve forthe product and ismuch flatter than
the short-n-un demand curve D,. This reflects the
greater- elasticity that is common over the long r’un.
The supply control that resulted in the doubling of
prices from P, to P, in the short run is markedly less
beneficial to producers oven’ the tong run. In this case,
the imposit ion of the supply restraint has a relatively
small effect on the price, raising it only to P,. Further-
more, ft appears that the total m-evenue has declined
through the use ofthe controls. The short-mn strate~’
that appear-ed to increase profits may lead to lower
future profits ifthe tong-run demand becomes etastic.
THE ECONOMICS OF SUPPLY
CONTROLS IN AN: OPEN ECONOMY
So far, we have focused on a simple economy with-
out international tr’ade to illustrate fundamental
points about supply control programs. This section
expands that analysis to include supply controls in a
wom’id economy with trade. The addition of tm-ade to
the analysis implies: Ii that a product may be pro-
‘For example, Houthakker and Taylor (1966) estimated the long-run
price elasticity forgasoline at .7, whilethe short-runelasticity was
estimated to be much more inelasticat — .2.
duced in countries outside ofthe country (orgn-oup of
countries attempting to increase n-etur-ns through a
supply control poticy, and 2) that the controlled good
can be traded between countries. tn a closed econ-
omy, aproduct’s price is determined solely by domes-
tic supply and demand. With the addition of trade,
price determination occurs in the world rather than
domestic market.
Figure 2 portrays price determination in the world
mnarket. Panel A repr-esents the domestic mar-ket for a
good. Panel B represents the supply and demand of
the product for alt other countries in the world. Fi-
nally, panel C is the world economy, which is deriyed
by horizontally combining the supply and demand
curves of the domestic and rest-of-the-world econo-
mies.
Ignoringtransportation costs, the equilibrium price
for both the domestic economy and the rest of the
worid is P,~. In this case, the equilibrium price is above
what the domestic price would have been in a closed
economy. According to panel A, at the world price,
domestic producers supply a larger quantity Q,,I
than domnestic consumer’s are wilting to purchase
QD.~. The difference between these two is exported to
the rest of theworld where, at DLV’ consumers demand
a larger quantity (Q,,,) than producers in therest ofthe
world are willing to supply Q,,) as shown in panel B.
The domestic economy in figure 2i sportrayed as
the dominant world supplier of a product for- which











Quantity QuantityFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1985
control in the domestic economy at the quantity Q
changes the wortd supply from S~to S.. This shift, in
turn, causes the world price to jump fromn P~to P~
Because of supply controls in the domestic econoriiy,
the quantitysupplied falls from ft., to ft. At the high-
erprice of ~L’ foreign pn-oductionincreases from Q,, to
Q’,,;while foreign consumption falls fm-om Q,, to Q’
As a result of these changes, the level of exports from
the domestic economy to the rest of the wonid de-
dines. The sham-es of won-Id tr’ade and won-id produc-
tion held by the domestic economy also decline.
The loss ofshares ofworld production and trade is a
predictable outcome of a supply control measure.
White an exporting countny might pn-efernot to lose its
shares ofworld pn’oduction and trade, it is more likely
to accept these losses if the supply contm-ots n-esult in
higher’ returns to producers. In figure 2,it appear-s that
returns would be increased in the short run because
the inelastic won-Id demand curve and the inelastic
foreign supply curve result in higher total revenue for
domestic producers.’
These short-run retur-ns will er-ode, however, be-
cause the pr-ice elasticities ofboth demand amid supply
increase over time. A given domestic supply control
results in a smaller’ price increase in the long run than
in the short run. This effect is even more pronounced
with international trade because the elasticity of fur-
eign, as well as domestic, supply goner-ally increases
over time. In the short run, producer’s are unable to
respond fully to a price increase because the capital
base used for production is fixed - Over alonger period,
producers can incr-ease output by adding production
capacity, improving technoto~’ andi adopting new
technology. This hong-run foreign supply m-esponse
contributes to the dectine in the share of world pn’o-
duction and tradeof the domestic countryby increas-
ing fbreign production and, in the process, reducing
the demand for’ the domestic countr’s exports. The
foreign supply m-esponse becomes increasingly more
imnpor-tant because of the gm-owing fbm-eign share of
womtd production.
‘The example of OPEC is instructive at this point. When OPEC
reducedproduction as a means ofincreasing the price ofcrudeoil, it
was logical toexpect that its shareof both oilexports and production
would fall. While its share fell, it was able to greatly increase its
returnsbecause ofthe elasticities of worlddemand and supply. With
a lack of acceptable energy sources as substitutes, the world
demand forcrude oil was extremely inelastic.The worldsupplyof oil
also was extremely inelastic because of the small share of world
production held by non-OPEC countries and the difficulty, expense
and time required to find and tap new oil reserves. If non-OPEC
countries had beenable to expand production easily and quickly in
responseto higher prices, the price increases would not have been
as great.
In summary, the intr-oduction ofinternational tm-ade
makes the decision to use supply control measures
dependent on the elasticity of won-Id demand arid
world supply. It is iriipon’tant to note that, while the
elasticity of foreign (rest-of-the—world) supply is im-
portant, it is the entine world’s elasticity of supply that
determines ifa domestic supply control program wilt
be effective. For example, for’eign supply may he very
elastic over a small marige; but if for’eign production
repm-esents only a small share of total world pn-oduc—
tiori, the domestic supply conti-olpn-ogram may stillbe
very profitable. This is truebecause the foreign supply
response, while very elastic, may tiave only a small
effect on the tnital quantity supplied in the world if
domestic production dwarfs foreign pn-oduction. A
natural consequence of domestic supply controls and
foreign supply elasticity, however-, is an increase inthe
foreign share nif world pn-oduction and a r’esuiting
increase in the won-id supply elasticity.
THE ORIGINAL TOBACCO PROGRAM
The cur-rent toliacco pn’ogn-ani has its roots in the
farmlegislation of the 1930s known as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act AAA). This legislation used pr-odmrc-
tion controls on most agricultural pm-oducts as a
means of iricm’easing prices. Of the nurlier-ous supply
contn’ot pn’ogr-amsproposed in the original AAA legisla-
tion, only the tobacco and peann.nt programs have
maintained direct production contriils.
‘the tobacco pr’ogr-am functioned, and continues to
ftrriction, by fim’sI establishing a support priceY Ini-
tially, fan-men-s were assigned allotments that indicated
the number (if acm-es of tobacco each farmer could
cultivate. tn the 1960s and T970s, the acreage allot-
merits were supplemented with marketing quotas that
limited the ntrmber- of pounds of tobacco each far-mer
could sell. These quotas were based on estimates of
the quantity that could be sold at the sinpport pr-ice.
The price support mechanism has changed (inly
slightly riven’ time. Initially, if a farmer did not receive
an offer- gn-eater than the support price, the govern-
ment purchased thefarmer’s tobacco amid held it until
it could be sotd at the support price. Imi the 1940s, a
system ofgrower-s cooper-atives was om-ganized mci pun’-
chase and hold the surplus tobacco. The coopen-atives
received, and continue to receive, govem-nment financ-
ing.
‘From its inception in the 1 930s until 1985, the tobaccosupport price
was based on a “parity index” which measures the ratio of prices
received by farmers to prices paid by farmers. The parity ratio is
typically criticized for having no relationship to market prices.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFST. LOUIS JANUAPYIFEBRUARY INS
Fom along pem’iod, the tobacco progr’ani was consid-
en-ed extn-emely successful. The price of U.S. tobacco
continued to rise, and the program was n.m at little
cost to the government. In addition, the quota rights to
grow and sell tobacco were marketable; in fact, they
generated as much as 5800 million peryear in income
for quota owners? It is, in part, because of the appar-
ent success of the tobacco pnogram that interest in
supply contmois has resurfaced for-other- crops.
‘the tobacco progn-am’s ability to endure while gen-
erating substantial wealth thmough the sale and leas-
ing ofquotas was attributable to the inelastic nature of
both world demand and supply of tobacco. The major
reason fur the inelastic supply m-esponse was that the
United States held a large shareoftheworid’s produc-
tion amid sales of particular varieties of tobacco.’ As
recently as the 1950s, the United States produced
more than 80 pen-cent ofthe world’s burtey tobacco.
It is imiipomtant to note that the US. dominance in
tobacco production and the inelasticity of world sup-
ply were even greater when one considers the impor-
tant distinction of tobacco quality. Owing to special
soil and climatic conditions and growing experience,
U.S. tobacco generally was regarded to be of un-
matched quality.” This further differentiated it from
tobacco grown in other countries. If other countries
were unalile to gm-ow super-ion’ quality tobacco even as
its pm-ice increased, the supply of that tobacco would
be considered perfect~inetastic. Perfectly inelastic
supply means that the quantity supplied woutd not
change when the price changed.
Thedemand for- tobacco, ingeneral,was also inelas-
tic. One source estimated the intermediate-run de-
mand elasticity of tobacco at — .t and the long-r-un
elasticity at 5.“The major reason for the inelastic
nattnn’e of tohiacco demand is the lack of substitutes.
The addictive riatur-e oftobacco fun’ther neduces sensi-
tivity to pnice changes. Furthermore, tobacco pun’—
‘Sumner and Alston (1985), p. 13. The U.S. General Accounting
Officestudy found that, althoughfarmers were the intended benefi-
ciaries ofthe tobacco program,68 percentofquota ownerswere not
active farmers. U.S. General AccountingOffice (1982), p. 18.
‘There are numerous varieties oftobacco. Two varieties, flue-cured
and burley, account formore than 90 percent of the tobacco grown
in the United States. There are othervarieties used in the blending
of cigarettes that are not grown in this country, such as Oriental
tobacco.
‘Starkey (1985), p. 50 and US. General Accounting Office (1982),
p.18.
“Tweeten (1970), p. 201. Thesemeasures of demand elasticity are
interpreted to mean that a 1 percent increase in pricewould leadto
onlya.1 percentdecreasein quantity demanded in the intermediate
run and to a .5 percent decrease in the long run.
chases generatly represent only a smalt shame of a
consumer’s budget, a fact that usually reduces the
elasticity of demand. While tobacco user-s can switch
fi’om US. to foreign tobacco (om cigamettes(, there ar-c
few substitutes for tobacco in general.
By using supply controls, U.S. tobacco producer-s
initially ean’ned higher incomes. Whihe the quantity of
tobacco marketed fetl, the nestnhtingpt-ice increase was
large enough to cause the total revenue n-eceived by
quota owner’s and tobacco gr-owers to increase. Be-
cause of the higher pnice, U.S. exports fell as foreign
consumers reduced theamount oftobacco pun-chased
at the higher price. Foreign supplier’s responded to
the higher price by producing hanger quantities of
tobacco.
SOME LONG-TERM TRENDS
The supply and demand analysis suggested that the
adoption of a supply control policy would lead to both
a reduction in U.S -production and asmaller U.S - sham-c
ofworld tn’ade and world pn’oduction. An examination
of tobacco pmoduction and quota trends documents
the hong-term process of n-educing the domestic to-
bacco industry as a means of maintaining the price
suppom’t mechanism. Chart I tracks the production of
tobacco in thetjnited States against the production of
tobacco in the rest of the won-Idover the past 30 years.
It shows that domestic production, though yan’iable,
has been tn-ending downward while foreign tobacco
pr-oduction has gm-own steadily. Since 1966, domestic
tobacco production has fallen by 38.8 percent, while
foreign pi-oduction has grown by 56.5 percent.
A longer-term pem’spective on the inupact of the
tobacco program restrictions cami be gained by exam-
ining act-cage data. The tobacco pn-ogr-am initially at-
tertnpted to contn-ot production solely by n-estnicting
the number of acres that farmer’s could gn-ow. Chart 2
shows the long-temm tn-end of failing acreage allot-
ment s.’’
Asyields increased, acm-cage limitations became less
effective in contm-ohhing production arid wer-e aug-
mented by marketing quotas that limited the numben’
of pounds of tobacco farmer’s coinid market. Chart 3
shows the trend of falling marketing quotas for’ flue-
cured and burley tobaccos, the two varieties that ac-
count for- 90 percent of all domestic tobacco produc-
“Althoughnot shown in the graph,tobacco acreage in 1986 wasat its
lowest point since 1874 as a result of the supply control program.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1988
Chart I
U.S. and Foreign Tobacco Production
limdez
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tion. The chart shows that, after’ initially m’ising,
poundage quotas for these two tobaccos generally
have been decreasing in the 1980s.
As indicated earlier’, a reduction in the U.S. shan-es of
won’hd tobacco production and total expon-ts is an
expected nesuht ofthe supply restriction. Table 1 docu-
ments these share losses. For example, in the 1955—59
peniod~the United States accounted for- more than 80
percent of the world’s production of burley tobacco.
By 1985, the U.S. shane ofbun’tey production had fallen
to 38 tiercent. Similar’ ti-ends are evident forflue-cured
tobacco and forthe category labeled “alt tobacco.”
Not only have the U.S. shames of world pn’oduction
and trade fallen, but the use of iniponted tobacco has
nisen substantially (see table 2). Until the 1970s, theuse
ofimported burley and flue-cur-ed tobacco was negli-
gible. tn 1969, hess than 1 percent of all bumtey tobacco
used in the United States was imported. By 1985,
imports accounted for more than 24 per’cent of all
burley use. Other- varieties not pn’oduced in this coun-
try, such as Oriental tobacco, continually have been
imported fOr blending purposes.
Another- important tn-end is the reduction of the
quality advantage that U.S. tobacco holds Over’foreign
tobacco. Numerous sour’ces assert that the quality gap
between foreign and domestic tobacco is nan-n-owing.”
This reflects the fact that attempts to inc.rease the
price of high-quality tobacco have provided foreign
producers with an incentive to imnprove the quality of
their tobacco. The result ofasmaller quality advantage
amid rising prices has hed, predictably, to the loss of
both domestic and foneign mam-kets for U.S. tobacco.
Over time, the demand for tJ.S.-pn-oduceci tobacco
has become nnon’e elastic as other soun’ces of supphv
from the n-est of the wom-id have appear-ed. The elastic-
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Chart 2
Harvested Acreage of Burley and Flue-Cured Tobacco
ity of supply also has mci-eased. In the short run,
foreign tobacco pm-oducers were limited in their m-e-
sponse to higher- tin-ices by their hand base and other
factors such as the knowhedge and technolo~’needeci
to produce highen’—quality tobacco. With time, how-
ever-, foreign pn-oducers have acquired these addi-
tional inputs. The result has been a dramatic increase
in the quantity of tobacco supplied by the nest of the
world. As a consequence, the impact of U.S. tobacco
policy on world tobacco markets has declined.
Although the long-r-un benefits of supp~ control
policies may lie in question for- 11.5. tobacco farmen-s,
beniefits for foreign producer-s am-C obvious. ‘these
benefits an’e confer-red in two ways. First, by n-estn’icting
the supply of U.S. tobacco initially thn’ough quotas amid
later through the maintenance (if the loani stocks by
tue gm-owen’s’ coopenatives, a higher won-Id price is
maintained. Second, the program creates a strong
incentive for foreign producers to improve the quality
of their’ tobacco by maintaining a higher’ pm-ice in the
market fon high—quality tobacco than would othemM’ise
result -
None of these tong-term tn-ends of decreasing pro-
duction, falling quotas or falling U.S. siiares, however,
wem-e cause for concer’n. The purpose of supp~ con-
trols was to n’aise the commodity’s price and, more
importantly, to n’aise the net revenue of fan-men-s. For
many yean’s the tobacco pr’ogn’am was successful in
thus respect.
Over a recent pen-iod, however’, the pm-ogram led to
tower’ mevenues fOr tobacco grower’s. From 1982 to
1985, the poundage allotments for but-Icy tobacco fell
by 30.4 percent. Over this same period, however’, the
ayerage price paid to growers for burley felt by 11.9
percent. ‘l’he combination of lower’ output and lower
price translated into a 38.7 per-cent decline in tobacco
m-eceipts for- bum’ley fan-men-s.
RECENT PROGR’%M DEVELOPMENTS
AND CHANGES
In the 1980s, the tobacco Iimicesupport mechanism
led to major problems. Thetobacco price support was,
Millions of acres
1.7
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Chart 3
Poundage Allotments for Burley and Flue-Cured Tobacco
Source: U.S. Department oi Agriculture
Table 1
U.S. Percentage of World Tobacco Production and Exports
Burley Flue-Cured All tobacco
Year Production Exports Production Exports Production Exports
1955-59 82% 60°c 60~. 23°c 35%
1960—61 80 37 40 52 25 30
1970 62 33 10 46 19 28
1975 32 27 28 33 18 20
1980 44 27 20 29 16 20
St 2’ ‘8 26 16 18
1982 49 30 13 73 13 18
1983 33 22 13 22 11 17
1984 42 18 12 24 12 17
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SOURCE US Department of Agrrcu.ture Tobacco Out/ook aria &itL,at’ori Repufl December ~986j. p 42FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1986
Table 2
Percentage of Imported Flue-Cured and
Burley Tobacco Used Domestically
Year beginning
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the ston-ed tobacco incn-eased. The assessments for
1986were estimated at 30 cents per pounud or $600 per
acne.
Legislation in 1985, however, relieved growers ofthe
potential liability fon’losses on the stored tobacco. The
ccc took title to the surplus stocks and sold them at
discounts of up to 90 percent, resulting in a net toss of
approximately $373 million. This loss will not be re-
covered thnough the No Net Cost Act.
In exchange for the gover-nment’s n-escue, tobacco
far-mers accepted lower support prices. Because ofthe
tower’ prices, the assessmenuts fell to Only 2 cerrts per
pound. The United States Department of Agriculture
USDAI also was given incn-eased fn-eedom to n-educe
tobacco pnces further if needed and was permitted to
use a more market-oriented method of calculating
suppor’t pr-ices and setting quotas.”
The new tobacco pn-ogn-arn has n-esulted in substan-
tially lower prices. ‘the average tobacco pn’ice paid to
gn’owen-s fell from $1.80 pen-pound in 1985 to $1.45 per
pound in 1986. As a result, tobacco exports rose in
1987. Imports also fell and now represent a smaller
share of the tobacco used in the United States. Man’ket-
ing quotas also have been increased in anticipation of
growing sales.
(IAN SUPPLY CON’TROLS BE USED
EFFECTIVELY ON OTHER CROPS?
The initial success of the tobacco program’s use of
supply controls can be attributed to supply and de-
mand chan-acteristics that ar-c not pn-esent for’ other
major crops. The tobacco program benefited fn-omthe
fact that the demanid for’ U.S. tobacco was inelastic
because ofalack of agood substitute. Additionally, the
won’td supply was inelastic because the United States
held a dominant share of the won-Id’s pn-oduction.
“Thesupport price formerly had been determined by a combination
of the parity index and limits set by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Tobacco support pricescurrently are determined by a formula using
five-year moving averages of tobacco prices and year-to-year
changes in costsof production. This approach is substantially more
“market-oriented” than the previous method, which was driven by
costs of numerous products unrelated to the open market for to-
bacco.
The USDA determines tobacco quotas based on three factors.
The first factor is the intended purchases of tobacco by cigarette
manufacturers based on the support price.Cigarette manufacturers
must provide these estimates and purchase a minimum of 90
percent of their stated intentions or face a penalty. The remaining
two factors arethe average tobacco exports of thepast three years
and an estimate of the quantity of tobacco needed to maintain
tobacco stocks at desired levels.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY•’FEBRUARY 1988
Most, if not all, other- majon crops do not enjoy these
clianacten-istics.
For example, if the United States were successful in
restn-icting the production of con-ni and raising its mar-
ket price, consumen-s would most likely switch to any
of the numerous crian-se gi-ains such as ban’Iey, sot’—
ghum, millet on- oats,which an-c acceptable substitutes
fon many of the feed uses of conni. On an international
level, the U.S. share of the won-Id’s coarse grains is
small. If it were to impose sinpplv controls on corn, it
would be necessary to n-estr-ict gr-eatlv the importation
offon’eign grain that would occun’ in n-espouse to higher
U.S. prices. Such tnade nestn-ictionis might negatively
affect the ability to export other U.S. commodities.
In some cn-ops, the United States does have a lan-ge
share of the world’s production. Because of the avail-
ability of substitutes, howeven-, supply r’estriction
would be ineffective. The United States, for example,
pn-oduces rrnor’e than half of the world’s soybeans.
Unfortunately fon’advocates of supply controls, othien
crops like con-n, coconut anid cotton seed can he sub-
stituted for soybeans as inputs for edible oil produc-
tion.
An additional factor- n-estn’icting the potential use of
supply controls for othen’crops is the won-Idelasticity
of supply ofthese crops. Most cr’ops for which supply
contn’ols have been considered in the United States
can be produced throughout the world. Wheat, for’
example, is pn-oduced in nnore than 100 countn’ies. If
the United States were successful in r-aisirig wheat
prices by reducing production, other wheat-
pn-oducing countries would be able to respond quickly
by incn-easing production while the non-wheat-
pnoducing countries would haveincentives to begin to
pr’oduce wheat.
SUMMARY
controlling the supply of agricultural pnoducts has
received attention n’ecently as a possible solution to
the problem of falling far’m prices and growing corn-
modity surpluses. The original tobacco program pro-
vides an insight inito the likely effects of such fanm
policy changes. The tobacco program enjoyed initial
success because of unique characteristics of the sup-
ply of and demand for’ tobacco. The man-ket power’ of
the United States in the won-Id tobacco rnan’ket, how-
even, has decreased over time as supply and demand
elasticities and the foreign shane of world pnoduction
have increased. To a lan-ge extent, the decline in man--
ket powen- can he attributed to US. policy actions. tn
response to this decline, the supply control program
has beenaltened tohe more market-oriented in setting
support pr’ices. The othien niajor cnops for which sup-
ply contnol legislation has been pnoposed do not have
the necessary supply and demand characteristics
needed to successftnlly impose a supply contn-ol pn’o-
gn-am, even in the sliont term.
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